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1 | INTRODUCTION
This is the second part of a comprehensive study on fair measurement of value in English insol-
vency law. The author has already demonstrated in a previous article1 the importance of posing
and responding to questions about fairness in the insolvency process. That article developed a
specific framework to measure whether assets and businesses are fairly valued in insolvency
and bankruptcy cases. The proposed communitarian, fairness-oriented framework is based on a
modified version of Rawls, Finch and Radin's concepts of fairness. It evidenced that when
assessed against fairness, none of the valuation techniques currently available to the courts are
without limitations. Building on the findings of this previous work, this article investigates
whether English case law:
i achieves a fair valuation of the debtor's assets and business; and
ii protects interested parties (mainly creditors and shareholders),2 who have realistic pros-
pects of receiving a distribution,3 against unfair harm.
As explained in the above-mentioned article, fairness is a key policy objective of English
insolvency law and issues of fairness feature prominently in recent high-profile cases, thus
prompting a regulatory debate in the area. This article adopts the same communitarian,
fairness-oriented framework advocated in the article mentioned above, as this framework
underpins English corporate insolvency law4 and recent policy documents do not depart from
this well-established approach.5
It is acknowledged that not all of English insolvency law follows communitarian tenets. In
fact, English insolvency law to an extent reflects all the purposes laid out by the various con-
tractarian theories. Creditor wealth maximization— emphasizing insolvency law as a pool of
debt in which creditors assert their claims as a collective— is reflective to a larger extent of liq-
uidation, and to a lesser extent of administration. Meanwhile, the broad-based contractarian
approach encompassing both creditors and non-creditors to maximize aims are a reflection of
the administration process with the primary objective of rescuing the corporation. This article
shows that, while concepts of fairness have featured increasingly in courts' decisions, much still
needs to be done to ensure substantive protection of non-sophisticated interested parties in
insolvency valuation disputes. As a result, it argues that fairness-oriented approaches should be
made transparent and become part of English insolvency law and policy. The findings of these
articles suggest that the current de-regulatory approach in insolvency may fall short of achiev-
ing the policy goals advocated by the law.
This article makes several original contributions to the topic of measurement of value in
insolvency and bankruptcy law. First, it carries out the first (as far as the author is aware) com-
prehensive documentary investigation into reported decisions on valuation disputes in English
insolvency and bankruptcy cases. This substantial documentary analysis shows that English
courts adopt consistent practices when valuing assets and businesses. These practices are based
on traditional valuation methodologies, such as market tests and liquidation values. Yet, despite
a praiseworthy usage of flexibility and discretion to achieve procedurally fair outcomes, English
courts fail to consistently ensure that interested parties are treated in a substantially fair and
just manner.
The second key contribution of this study is its discussion on the impact of a fairness-
oriented framework, which addresses substantive as well as procedural issues, on judicial pow-
ers, and what is needed to make this approach transparent. In particular, this article
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investigates if and to what extent a fairness-oriented framework can be used to decide between
competing valuations; to determine if assets and businesses are sold at a fair value, both in and
outside pre-packaged administrations; and to assess if the office holders' actions have caused
unfair harm to the interested parties.
In this study, fairness is understood as a substantive and procedural concept. It is submitted
that procedural fairness is the propensity of the system to rely on replicable and competitive
techniques to value assets and to allow interested parties to challenge decisions taken in the
course of insolvency procedures. Substantive fairness is the propensity of the system to adjudi-
cate in favour of the parties who have a lawful interest under the law whenever valuation deci-
sions do not take the best interests of the parties concerned, the peculiarities of the valued
assets, business or the market or the claimant-defendant relationship into reasonable account
or do not treat similar situations alike.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the result of the documentary investiga-
tion. It shows that courts consistently apply procedural but not substantive notions of fairness
in valuation cases. Section 3 demonstrates how the usage of a regulatory-heavy approach to pro-
mote substantive, and not simply procedural, fairness would impact the notions of “fair value”
and “unfair harm.” It also questions whether the regulatory-heavy approach should be pre-
ferred over de-regulatory practices currently followed by the English courts and the legislator.
Recent developments in case law are also examined to show whether they promote substantive
as well as procedural fairness. Section 4 sums up the conclusions of the study. It highlights the
importance of giving more explicit recognition to the concept of procedural and substantive
fairness in insolvency and suggests a list of regulatory recommendations.
2 | A FAIR JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE VALUATION OF
ASSETS?
The lack of uniform approaches and clear guidance for the evaluation of assets and challenges
to valuations affects the behaviour of parties, inside and outside insolvency. In an influential
piece in 2006, Baird and Bernstein argued that this uncertainty causes parties to opt for an out-
of-court restructuring instead of the formal corporate insolvency procedures.6 Others have
observed that valuation uncertainties may induce the party with a better case to steer away
from litigation, while the party with the worst case has an incentive to steer towards it in the
hope of a windfall.7
It is pertinent, therefore, to investigate if English courts adopt a consistent approach in
assessing the fair market value of the debtor's business and assets. It is equally appropriate to
determine whether these approaches protect the interested parties from unfair harm. No valua-
tion method is unfair per se. It is their use by the judiciary on the basis of the circumstances of
the case that determines the overall degree of fairness of the system. As a result, a documentary
analysis of 31 judgments has been carried out in order to test the fairness of the English judicial
approach to measure value in insolvency cases. The following judgments were considered:
• All the judgments issued in corporate rescue procedures decided in the period January
1, 2014–June 30, 2019 that included the word “valuation” in a keyword search on West-
law; and
• Some of the most frequently cited decisions on valuations in corporate rescue procedures for
the years before December 31, 2013.
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These judgments offer a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of how English courts deal
with valuation issues in bankruptcy and insolvency cases. Out of these judgments, only 26 rul-
ings were relevant for the purposes of this review as in the remaining five cases the courts did
not address valuation issues.
The results show that courts tend to rely on and apply primarily traditional valuation tech-
niques. As evidenced by Figure 1:
• The actual valuation (“AV”) method (market testing, usually by public auction) was men-
tioned in 20 cases (77% of the sample) and applied in 17 of them (65.4%); and
• The liquidation method (“LM”) was mentioned in 11 cases (42.3%) and applied in 8 of
them (30.8%).
The other valuation methods most frequently considered are the discounted cash-flow
(“DCF”) (7 cases, 23.1% of the sample) and the comparable transaction multiple (“CTM”)
(5 cases, 19.2 of the sample) methods. Valuation methodologies which require deeper knowl-
edge of finance, economics and statistics in order to be understood and applied - such as compa-
rable companies multiple, leveraged buy-out, contractual valuation mechanisms (2 cases, 7.7%
each) and market capitalisation (1 case, 3.8%) - feature in a negligible number of rulings.
These preliminary findings cast doubt on the ability of the system to reach fair decisions, as
courts make predominant use of methods that, as evidenced in a previous article,8 only ensure
procedural as opposed to substantive fairness.
These results also show that courts rely on market testing and/or expert valuations in 19 out
of 26 cases (73.1%), mainly where the sale is to a connected party.9 This figure is certainly
meaningful. However, it is probably even more significant that in seven valuation cases (26.9%
of the sample), judges did not rely on competitive market testing and/or independent valuations
from experts to determine the value of the debtor's assets and business. This finding casts seri-
ous doubt on the overall fairness of the system. In the cases where no market tests or indepen-
dent valuations are provided,10 judges either rely on contractual clauses to determine the value
of the contested assets11 or on their own independent assessment to determine the quantum
meruit of the case.12 Another seven cases have been decided based on the DCF method, which
is highly dependent on the co-operation and data provided by the debtor. These findings suggest
0
5
10
15
20
25
AV DCF CCM CTM MC LBO LM CVM
Followed
Considered
Rejected
Total
FIGURE 1 Valuation methods in English insolvency cases. Source: Survey data collection
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that claimants face an uphill struggle to achieve fair valuations. In fact, in 14 out of 26 cases
(53.8% of the sample) there are questionable elements in relation to not only the substantive,
but also the procedural fairness of the approach followed by the courts (and the parties) to mea-
sure the debtor's worth (Figure 2).
The following sub-sections assess the results of this documentary analysis in depth to deter-
mine if the existing valuation practices followed by the courts comply with the proposed
fairness-oriented framework.
2.1 | Valuations: The issue of proper timing
With reference to timing, the results of the documentary analysis show that courts require the
debtor's assessment to be carried out at a date as close as possible to the actual sale.13 Courts
tend to dismiss evidence that suggests a higher value of the assets or business in the near or
not-so-near future, especially when the sold assets or businesses have been extensively tested in
the market.14 This is because courts consider that the (hypothetical) higher proceeds from the
sale may not result in higher returns to creditors due to a variety of factors, such as depreciation
of assets and increased interest on debt and professional fees.15 Courts also dismiss claims that
insolvency practitioners (“IPs”) have an obligation to sell the assets or business at a propitious
time, as this view is explicitly rejected with reference to mortgagees.16
It can be argued, however, that this focus on the value at the time of the sale may be mis-
placed. It may lead to results that do not represent the substantially fair value of the debtor's
assets and business. It is common knowledge, in fact, that the value of the debtor's assets and
business is dependent on the nature of the purchaser. Take, for instance, the case of a sale by
auction of a car manufacturer (“A”) in which there are two potential bidders. One is a real
estate developer (“B”) interested in closing the factories and selling the properties in the market
for a profit. The other one is a competing car manufacturer (“C”), interested in preserving the
profitable part of the insolvent business for the economies of scale arising from their merger.
In the first scenario (B buys A), the preferred valuation method would be the LM. In the sec-
ond scenario (C buys A), the bidders would opt for a DCF method. Clearly, company B would
Market Test (MT)
Invependent Valuation (IV)
MT and IV
No MT, No IV
FIGURE 2 Evidence used in court. Source: Survey data collection
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be willing to pay a much lower price than company C. If company C buys the insolvent busi-
ness at a price which is higher than the liquidation value but lower than the DCF price, would
the sale be upheld by an English court? According to the evidence collected in this study, the
answer would be in the affirmative. However, it is questionable whether this purchase price
represents a substantially fair value of the debtor's assets and business. This example, therefore,
shows that by adopting a mechanistic approach, courts may ensure consistency and predictabil-
ity of outcomes and replicability of results (i.e., procedural fairness). However, they may fail to
properly assess the “true,” peculiar value of the assets and business for the purchaser and the
nature of the relationship between debtor and creditor.
Another element that suggests the courts' focus on procedural rather than substantive fair-
ness is the requirement for timely and constant involvement of the creditors throughout the
negotiation phase. As a result, late challenges may affect the court's willingness to dismiss an
existing valuation.17 However, the lateness of a challenge should not in itself affect its outcome,
as otherwise this solution would impinge on the substantive fairness of the procedure.
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, to assess the value of the debtor market testing is
not always necessary.18 In particular, in Saltri III, Eder J held that market testing is not needed
if running a lengthier auction procedure would be impracticable, impossible or damaging and it
would not yield higher offers.19 In Saltri III, the mezzanine lenders argued that the actual value
of the company was affected by the particularly challenging period in the automotive industry
in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis and the Chapter 11 filings of Chrysler and General
Motors. While admitting that there was no value left in their investment, the mezzanine lenders
based their claims on the expected recovery of the restructured group.20 In this case, the court
held that it had no discretion to depart from AV valuations, potentially undervaluing the com-
pany (as it turned out to be the case) and ignoring issues of substantive fairness.
The author agrees that under perfect market conditions, auctions are “the best way of find-
ing out the market value of an asset.”21 Unsurprisingly, courts held that in appropriate cases,
the process of testing the market by holding an auction might make it reasonable to proceed
without seeking valuation advice, particularly where the claim's valuation is difficult.22 As a
result, in Goel v Grant, Halpern J held that the company administrators had not unfairly
harmed the interests of creditors under paragraph 74 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986
(“IA 1986”) by deciding to auction a claim that the insolvent company potentially had against
its former directors without obtaining a preliminary valuation of that claim.23 Similarly, in
Wind Hellas,24 the court sacrificed the need to carry out a thorough valuation due to the
urgency to complete the transaction to preserve the debtor's going concern.25 There is the risk,
however, that such decisions prove ill-judged and unfair to the affected creditors if the company
later falls into liquidation, as was the case in Wind Hellas.26
It is not possible to draw general conclusions on whether this approach (auction without
valuation) is “fair.” It very much depends on the circumstances of the case and on the market
for the assets or business. For instance, in Wind Hellas, while the business was market-tested
through an auction process, the sale procedure resembled a validation technique rather than a
true method of maximizing value.27 In Wind Hellas, the junior lenders and third parties did not
have enough time to complete due diligence and submit a competing bid. In Goel v Grant, the
office holder obtained only a small amount of money for the sale of the claim. In other words,
on both occasions the ways in which the auction procedures were carried out raise issues of
substantive unfairness.
Finally, market testing can sometimes prevail over conflicting, independent valuations. This
was what happened in Chadwick, where the court held that insufficient evidence of a clear
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intention by the parties to enter into a binding collateral agreement for the value of the prop-
erty, as assessed by an independent valuer. The court allowed the trustee in bankruptcy to rely
on the higher estimate of the value of the property that emerged from the market test rather
than on the figure previously suggested by the independent expert.28 Like Goel v Grant, Chad-
wick followed the precedent of Ludsin, where Baldwin J held that:
“the best indication of the value of an asset at any particular time was what some-
one would pay for it after reasonable attempts had been made to sell it.”29
As a result, evidence to the effect that nobody had been prepared to offer even GBP 2 million
for a property after 6 months of marketing by a well-known and reputable agent was more per-
suasive than expert evidence, obtained before the marketing process had begun, of GBP 3.35
million. The circumstances of Chadwick may suggest that the result was substantially and not
simply procedurally fair. However, courts do not always actively consider the peculiarities of
the assets and those of the market at the time of the auction. As a result, both in Ludsin and
Chadwick, the parties reached a substantially fair outcome more by chance than by a purposeful
stride to achieve that outcome.
These cases show the English courts' reliance on market testing. This is usually described as
an AV approach, but it shares many more similarities with a liquidation method, as the main
concern is the price that a party would pay for the auctioned assets at the time of the sale. The
courts have shown a reluctance to depart from market testing where there are no specific rea-
sons that require a quick sale of the assets and where speed appears to be an excuse generated
by the connected bidder to obtain a more favourable price for the debtor's assets or business.30
At the same time, this reliance on market testing may result in undervaluing the debtor's assets
and business. In fact, the hammer price is not always a fair assessment of the debtor's intrinsic
and potential value as well as of the money that the bidder would be willing to pay for the
assets or business, especially if the bidder was not aware of the distressed condition of the
debtor.
2.2 | Valuations: The issue of proper methods
With reference to methods, the results of this substantial documentary analysis show that
parties have no absolute obligation to follow any particular procedure or to obtain any particu-
lar advice in deciding how the debtor's assets should be sold.31 However, creditors – and secured
ones in particular – bear the burden of showing that they took reasonable steps to obtain a
proper price,32 especially in cases of sales to connected parties.33 This seems to suggest that suf-
ficient protections are being adopted to ensure that assets are sold at a fair price and that credi-
tors are not unfairly harmed. In other words, this seems to suggest a stride towards substantive
fairness in the valuation process.
In Philbin,34 for instance, the court found that a secured creditor failed to meet that burden
when the respondent took possession of the charged properties as mortgagee and sold them for
GBP 2 million to a company he owned and controlled. The sale was conducted on the basis of
the low estimates for fire sales valuations in the Christmas period “without vacant possession.”
The mortgagee made no effort to properly market the properties or to check if the tenants were
willing to peacefully vacate them. The applicant produced valuations of GBP 4.8 million to GBP
5.5 million for the same properties, if these were sold at an auction under normal market
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conditions. This case shows that the court adopted the enhanced notion of fairness suggested by
this article and assessed the transaction against this yardstick. It considered that the market
price obtained for those properties was affected by the circumstances of the sale and, therefore,
did not lead to a fair valuation of the debtor's assets.
Nevertheless, in general, courts tend to prefer AV, market-testing approaches over compet-
ing methodologies,35 especially in real estate and liquidation cases.36 As the market value is one
to be determined as a matter of historic fact, based on expert evidence,37 the focus is very much
on procedural rather than substantive fairness. Some rescue cases where courts followed an AV
approach also make reference to liquidation values when:
i this appears necessary to assess the rights of the claimants/creditors; and
ii the alternative to the proposed rescue procedure is a distribution of assets in a
winding-up.38
Again, it is argued that this is not the proper course of action, as this approach overlooks
the peculiarities of the claimant-defendant relationship and substantially undervalues the
debtor's business. AVs on a going concern basis should be preferred where companies are only
financially as opposed to economically distressed39 and:
“assets have a higher value if kept together as a functioning unit than if sold off
piecemeal.”40
Yet, this study has shown no evidence that courts are willing to depart from market values
solely on the basis that the price obtained from the competitive procedure underestimates the
going concern value of the business.
At the same time, courts are willing to complement AV approaches with CTM and other
market-testing methods whenever the insolvency procedure aims at liquidating/selling assets
and there is a restrictive but competitive market for the company's assets.41 Courts in particular
appreciate techniques that lead to “true” market value and/or the best prices reasonably obtain-
able for the transaction.42 In IMO Car Wash,43 for instance, the court concluded that to deter-
mine the value of the distressed business on a going concern basis, valuations could be based
on multiple standards, namely discounted cash-flow (“DCF”), comparable companies multiple
(“CCM”) and leveraged buy-out (“LBO”).
This case law is promising, but it is very much inconsistent across the sample analysed in
this study. In fact, multi-method approaches feature only in a minority of cases (5 cases, 19.2%
of the sample).44 Additionally, in a recent case,45 the court rejected the multi-method approach
and relied only on one valuation technique to determine the value of the debtor's assets.46
English courts usually uphold the choice of the parties to rely on CVMs if:
i the clause is binding47;
ii similar clauses are used in a variety of similar circumstances;
iii their use does not appear inappropriate in light of the circumstances of the instant
case48; and
iv such use would have been approved by a person acting rationally and not arbitrarily or
perversely.49
Pursuant to the established case law, the circumstances that the sale are carried out in an
illiquid and distressed market are not in itself sufficient to dismiss the validity of a contractual
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valuation clause.50 This is because the contracting parties should have considered the risk of
economic or financial downturn at the time in which they negotiated the clause or entered into
the agreement. If they failed to consider this risk, it is not for the courts to invalidate the clause,
as this would result in a windfall for one of the parties.
Once again, the existing system of checks and balances is not appropriate to ensure
enhanced fairness in the valuation process. The standard for challenging the usage of these
clauses (perversity and negligent behaviour) is too high. Additionally, the praiseworthy mention
that courts should consider the specific circumstances of the case is de facto counterbalanced by
the lack of available remedies if the sale is carried out in an illiquid or distressed market.
By upholding the choice of the parties to rely on CVMs, English courts promote consistency
and predictability of results over protection from abusive market practices. Nevertheless, courts
are aware that undervaluation of assets is likely to happen in sales to connected parties, as in
Philbin, due to the proximity of seller and buyer. Philbin was not an isolated case. In Brewer,51
intangible assets worth between GBP 1.9 and GBP 2.35 million were sold to an associated com-
pany for GBP 40,000. In Goel,52 the administrators arranged a pre-packaged sale for GBP 1.5 mil-
lion to a connected company owned by a minority shareholder and director of the debtor. In
the following trial on the assignment of a claim against the previous directors for unlawful
means conspiracy, it was argued that the sale undervalued the company by almost GBP
12 million!53
Many of the cases and the guidance provided by courts in the area focus on giving detailed
directions on valuations in sales to connected parties.54 It was held that in any sales to associ-
ates and/or connected parties, the sale is presumed invalid unless the seller can demonstrate
that he acted in good faith55 and can exclude the possibility of any conscious or unconscious
preference. The sellers must show that they took all reasonable precautions to obtain the best
possible price56 or, at least, that they took reasonable care to maximize the return from the
property.57 This generally means that the sale was carried out by means of a public auction
rather than as a private sale and that the reserve price was determined on the basis of
independently-obtained expert valuations.58 In some instances, this obligation might include a
duty to attempt to sell a business as a going concern, unless the proprietors had closed down
the business and moved from the premises prior to the mortgagee repossessing the property.59
Two caveats apply to this expansion of the rights and responsibilities of the office holders.
First, as mentioned in the previous section of this article, sale by auction (or by another compet-
itive method) does not in itself result in fair valuations, especially if it only produces one or very
few bids.60 The price bid at auction tells one nothing about the value of the property.61 Secondly
and more importantly, it is well established that office holders are not subject to the same equi-
table duties and standards as a trustee when selling property of the company under his con-
trol.62 Office holders in general, and administrators in particular, are subject to the fiduciary
duties of agents to act in good faith, loyally and for proper purposes.63 The duty to exercise rea-
sonable skill and care is tested against the standard of an ordinary, skilled practitioner.64 Chal-
lenging a decision from an office holder requires proof of negligent or perverse behaviour65 that
would unfairly harm the creditors. It requires proof of behaviour that could not be justified by
reference to the creditors' interests as a whole or to the administration's objective.66
These safeguards ensure procedurally fair outcomes. They result in replicable and predict-
able decisions and allow interested parties to challenge any deviations from the established
approaches. The rules are not, however, set in stone. Courts use their discretion to validate
transactions that are the result of negligent or perverse behaviour but, otherwise, in the best
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interest of all creditors. In particular, courts have reiterated that there is no absolute obligation
on the mortgagee/IP to take and act upon independent expert advice.67
Consequently, in Alpstream, Clarke LJ refused to invalidate a private sale to a connected
party, even though the mortgagee did not take all:
“reasonable precautions to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the time of sale.”68
In fact, the mortgagee did not rely on any independent valuation and the auction process
was poorly carried out. However, it was proven to the satisfaction of the court that there was no
bidder prepared to pay the independent valuation price at the time of the sale. The price offered
by the connected party was comfortably above what others had offered or would have offered at
a perfectly arranged auction, and the connected party was not prepared to pay more.69 As no
unfair harm was caused to creditors and the price paid by the connected party was overall fair,
the court dismissed a claim for damages against the mortgagee and the connected purchaser.70
Furthermore, some cases seem to suggest that where the sale of a charged asset is to a con-
nected, affiliated or associated person, there is no absolute obligation for the mortgagee to take
and act upon independent expert advice as to the steps which ought to be taken to make the
sale a success.71 These authorities do not prescribe any particular procedure which a mortgagee
should adopt in deciding the manner in which the charged asset should be sold, whether as to
marketing, advertising or otherwise.72 This leaves us with conflicting guidelines.
It is true that English courts stress the need to ensure fairness and achieve a “fair value” for
the creditors,73 values which feature in a significant number (10) and portion (38.5%) of the
cases in the sample. Additionally, courts are ready to accept that creditors' interests outweigh
all other considerations74 and that expert valuations can be challenged.75 However, creditors'
rights do not prevail over those of innocent third parties absent fraud.76 Additionally, courts are
unlikely to challenge any valuation which appears to be procedurally fair, even if a market-
based approach would have yielded a different result77 and even if such a value contrasts with
the opinion of an expert valuer.78 Claimants do not have any remedy if they are not capable of
proving that the failure to carry out a market test or independent valuation has caused any loss
to them.79
This, however, represents a significantly high burden of proof for petitions submitted by
third-party and generally unsecured creditors. Where there has been no independent valuation,
the claim is dismissed if no better price would have been obtained and the connected party had
been under no duty to pay more than it was prepared to pay.80 If there was no proper marketing
and sales process, the claim is dismissed in the overwhelming likelihood that the price obtained
would not have been higher with a competitive marketing and sales process in place than the
liabilities owed to the preferential lenders.81
Courts have also dismissed claims by creditors whenever the cause of action was a difficult
asset to value and the decision to sell it by auction (AV method) did not unfairly harm the
claimants.82 Equally, they have dismissed claims whenever it appeared from expert valuations
that the non-connected buyer acted in good faith and purchased the asset for full value or near
full value.83 Once again, these examples show the significantly high thresholds that any poten-
tial claimants have to overcome in valuation cases.
To sum up, courts do not interfere with the decision made by the office holder unless:
i the IP treated the applicants less favourably than other creditors;
ii the decision could not be justified by reference to the interests of the creditors as a whole or
to achieve the objective of the procedure; and
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iii the decision did not withstand logical analysis, which probably meant the same as
“perversity.”84
Reliance on this three-prong test and – in particular – on the last element of this test means
that existing case law fails to provide sufficient protection against substantive unfairness. This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that, where valuations present certain features, they
are unlikely to be questioned by the courts. In particular, valuations are not closely scruti-
nized if:
i the IPs relied on independent experts and on objective data85 as well as their own
judgment86;
ii valuations are easy to understand for non-financial professionals; and
iii valuations offer a single point value rather than a range of values or – even worse – a range
of possibilities.87
While valuations need not to be perfect to be relevant, they may rely on evidence of second-
ary markets.88 If valuations present these features and are not subject to criticism from the cred-
itors, courts find it unreasonable to carry out an extensive analysis of the criteria and outcome
of these valuations.
It is appropriate to say, however, that it does not follow that any valuations that present the
characteristics mentioned above cannot be subject to judicial scrutiny. For instance, in
Sinclair,89 a substantial difference between the price of a property sold in a formal insolvency
procedure and that of its immediate subsequent sale was found sufficient to grant permission
for an action for breach of duty against the IP. This conclusion was reached irrespective of the
fact that the IP relied on two independent valuations from reputable national firms and the sale
occurred through expert selling agents.90 Such a course of action is consistent with other cases
which, while falling short on imposing an obligation on the mortgagee to delay a sale in the
hope of getting a higher price in the future,91 hint at the possibility of demonstrating unfairness
where there is an expectation of market improvement in the near future.92 Yet the cases where
courts focused on substantive rather than procedural unfairness are few and far between. The
consistent approach adopted by English courts has been to ensure procedural fairness and pre-
dictability of outcomes.
The final element that needs to be assessed to determine if courts' practices lead to fair mar-
ket values and claimants are protected against unfair harm is the judicial approach to the case
of similarly objective and independent valuations. Courts are unanimous in claiming that valu-
ations should not be averaged but they should be distinguished based on their persuasiveness.93
This statement fits very well with the proposed fairness-oriented framework because it allows
interested parties to go beyond a mechanistic approach to valuation.
In Stanley J Holmes,94 Arden LJ stated that when judges are faced with two different valua-
tions, they have to find a way of distinguishing the two. This approach to the assessment of
expert valuations was followed in Wilson, where the court accepted a valuation of a property
based on an investment method, rather than on an owner-occupation method. This is because
the property subject to valuation was a commercial property and, therefore, more likely to
attract a retail investor rather than a property owner.95 This approach was equally followed in
Cahillane, where the registrar rejected an argument that properties should be valued on the
basis of their potential future value rather than the present one. This is because the indepen-
dent expert who supported the future value approach had no statistical data in support of his
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analysis, made conflicting statements, did not consider alternative methods and did not inspect
any of the properties.96
In Brewer, Briggs J, after having established the existence of a breach of duty of care and
skill by the administrator of a pre-packaged sale, went on to quantify the equitable compensa-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty. In doing so, he considered the expert evidence provided by
both the applicant (the joint liquidators) and the defendant (Mr Iqbal). He eventually decided
to rely on the applicant's expert due to a variety of considerations, including the fact that the
valuer had been active in the market for Electronic Programming Guides (“EPGs”) (the intangi-
ble assets of the sale) since its establishment 15 years before. Furthermore, Briggs J did not
accept the applicant's findings at face value, as the court discounted the expert valuation of a
figure between 50 and 80% due to a variety of factors listed in some detail. Other cases equally
dismissed independent reports based on dubious or incomplete evidence,97 their lack of clarity
in the methodology and their reliance on subjective assessments.98
Courts also recognize that the persuasiveness of a valuation is highly dependent on the qual-
ities of the expert witness and on whether the valuation procedure considered different methods
to maximize the value of the debtors' assets or business.99 Preference is normally given to valua-
tions where the methodology and key assumptions are clearly articulated100 and which are not
based on speculations.101 Courts have to consider all the circumstances to determine if a valua-
tion has been carried out properly.102 Should the valuation be based on unfair terms and rela-
tionships, courts may confirm the method chosen for the valuation but they would be able to
vary rates of interest, impose penalties and deprive the respondent of all or some of the interest
claimed.103 If there is nothing to choose between valuers, judges should not arbitrarily pick up
a half-way figure, but they should rely on the lower estimate produced by the parties. This is the
conclusion reiterated by Arden LJ in Stanley J Holmes,104 where the Court of Appeal reversed
the lower court's decision to fix the value of machinery:
“on a figure of GBP 65,000, which happens to be half-way between GBP 50,000 and
GBP 80,000 (the figures from the expert valuations).”105
Arden LJ emphatically observed that:
“it is not a judicial process simply to fix a midway point between the two valuers.
[…] The judge was faced with two different valuations and he had either to find a
way of distinguishing the two or he had to conclude that he was not persuaded that
anything more than [GBP] 50,000 was justified.”106
However, valuation is and remains a discretionary process. Courts acknowledge this circum-
stance, as they have consistently reinstated that judicial assessment should be allowed and pre-
ferred over more mechanistic and robotic valuations. Valuers and courts should have the
discretion to make some real-world judgements as to what is likely to happen.107 For instance,
in Rowbury, the court estimated the applicants' debt at the value of GBP 1 because, despite the
existence of a conditional fee agreement upon which the credit was based, the bill lacked expla-
nation, included non-agreed costs, failed to itemize statements and presented some
inaccuracies.108
Courts also make wide and generally wise use of their discretion.109 For instance, AMT Cof-
fee reinstates the English courts' reluctance to identify fixed, pre-determined approaches to valu-
ation. According to this decision, the proper method should be determined in light of the
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circumstances of the case. The “proper method” is the one that – depending on the said circum-
stances – appears the most appropriate to achieve justice and lead to a “fair price.”110 It is ques-
tionable, however, whether these clarifications are sufficient to ensure procedurally and
substantially fair outcomes in insolvency valuation cases when other cases analysed in this
section show a lack of consistency of approaches to this matter.
2.3 | Abstract
The analysis of the sample of cases investigated in this article shows that courts adopt recog-
nized and consistent approaches to valuations, capable of ensuring adequate levels of proce-
dural safeguards against unfair harm. With reference to substantive safeguards, the findings
from the review of cases provide ambiguous answers. On the one hand, claimants seem to face
a high burden of proof to challenge valuations and the “fair” nature of a market-tested price.
On the other, courts seem to use their discretion and legal expertise to choose between compet-
ing valuations. Overall, however, it seems that the courts' main concern is to ensure procedural
fairness and predictability of outcomes, which is not necessarily in line with the fairness-
oriented framework advocated by this article.
3 | REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Two approaches are possible to ensure fairness of outcomes in valuation disputes. The merits
and limits of the light-touch, de-regulatory approach currently used by English courts have
been discussed in the previous section. It is now pertinent to explore if encompassing enhanced
fairness tenets (the so-called interventionist, regulatory-heavy approach) in the law is to be pre-
ferred over the existing de-regulatory practices.
3.1 | The critical concept of “fair (market) value”
A critical aspect that emerges from the case law analysed for this research is the centrality of
the definition of “fair (market) value.” Courts can use their discretion to depart from sale prices
and expert valuations if these are not “fair.” According to the case law, a valuation is fair if it is
in the best interest of creditors or such as an intelligent and honest creditor would reasonably
approve.111 This may suggest that courts do adopt a definition of fairness, which is close to the
one proposed in this article because it considers elements of substantive fairness.
Fair value is a term that appears frequently in insolvency cases,112 but it is much more com-
monly used in valuations prepared for tax, financial reporting and investment purposes. In the
absence of any statutory guidance in the IA 1986, English courts apply the standards defined in
the accounting literature to insolvency cases.
In non-insolvency contexts, according to the International Financial Reporting Standard
(“IFRS”) 13, “fair value” represents the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement
date (an exit price).113 However, it can be argued that the notion of fair value may and should
differ from non-insolvency cases. In fact, IFRS standards are useful to obtain the actual
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valuation of an asset. They promote procedural fairness, but they are less useful in dealing with
the substantive side of this concept.
Some decisions,114 many of them not even in the insolvency context,115 have provided some
guidance for the general use of the notion of fair value outside the context for which it was con-
ceived (i.e., reporting practices). These guidelines are influenced by the fact that most of these
decisions deal with valuation issues for shares in a company. With reference to insolvency
cases, LBI EHF116 is a seminal case, specifically in relation to those contracts that are subject to
Global Master Repurchase Agreement (“GMRA”) terms. Other cases have also highlighted that
the concept of “fair value” is strictly linked to a “fair valuation date,” which is a date as close as
possible to the actual sale.117
Fair values can be obtained even when the sale is carried out in a distressed market.118 Such
a conclusion is in line with the absence of any obligation on IPs to delay a sale in the hope of
receiving a higher price.119 Fair values can be determined in accordance with specific provisions
in the company's articles of association120 and/or pursuant to clauses in a contract121 and/or in
a joint venture agreement.122 It is a well-established rule when valuing assets and businesses at
a particular date to exclude evidence of events which occurred after that date.123 However, a
reasonable forecast of the future can be included in the fair value assessment.124 The latter
point is contentious, as courts seem to depart from including evidence of future events on some
occasions.125
Therefore, it seems inasmuch that English case law on “fair value” ensures only procedural,
as opposed to substantive fairness. English courts have clarified that it is not up to judges to
determine what the fair value is.126 As a result, courts will interfere in the non-defaulting party's
assessment only in extreme circumstances, such as when the assessment appears as extreme as
to be irrational.127 This is because courts do not “seek to establish an ‘objectively reasonable’
fair market value.”128
Nevertheless, on some occasions, English courts depart from this narrative. In Ahmed it was
held that “fair value” is something separate from “market value”: “shares should be valued at a
fair value, as opposed to a market value.”129 This conclusion, which goes beyond the guidance
from IFRS 13 in order to promote substantive over procedural fairness, has been adopted only
in a minority of cases. The majority approach is the one described in AMT Coffee, where the
court held that:
“sale and purchase of the shares at an undiscounted valuation will do justice, and
amount to a ‘fair price’.”130
In other words, the court in AMT Coffee held that fair value amounted to the market price
for those shares. Moreover, in Cuckmere Brick, the Court of Appeal conflated the notion of
proper, fair and best price in what they preferred to call “the true market value.”131
Enhanced clarity on this notion is, therefore, needed to ensure substantive and not simply
procedural fairness in valuation disputes. As a way forward, it is submitted that a promising
approach is to introduce a revised version of the insolvency provisions dealing with transactions
at undervalue, which are section 238 of the IA 1986 (with reference to companies) and
section 339 of the IA 1986 (with reference to people). These sections should include a general
definition of “fair value” for insolvency and bankruptcy cases, which would apply absent any
alternative choice made by the parties. For the reasons evidenced in this sub-section, the pro-
posed definition of “fair value” should not be the indubitable equivalent of the concept of “mar-
ket value” and, consequently, of the definition provided by IFRS 13. If “fair value” were not
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different from “market value,” it would represent the amount for which an asset, liability or
business could be exchanged in an arm's length transaction between unrelated, willing parties
who are reasonably well-informed.
However, prevailing market conditions may mean that nobody at that particular moment in
time is willing to pay a fair, market price for the assets or business on sale.132 As a result, the
notion of fair value should also make reference to the notion of “disposal value” set out in Arti-
cle 12(5) of the regulation on valuation before resolution.133 The disposal value is the value that
“the entity can reasonably expect in the currently prevailing market conditions through an
orderly sale or transfer of assets or liabilities.” Finally, it should also be clarified that a reason-
able forecast of future events should be included in the fair value assessment to ensure substan-
tive and not just procedural fairness.
The other issue related to fair value assessment is the courts' attitude to second-guess busi-
ness judgments. The requirements set out in LBI EHF (no challenges to valuations which
appear to be procedurally fair, even if a market-based approach would have yielded a different
result) make it extremely difficult for the claimants to contest the decision of the IP with refer-
ence to the price of the debtor's assets and business. As a result, it is argued that courts should
not discuss the fairness of the valuation solely in “extreme” circumstances. A preferred
approach would be to argue that, if a claimant submits sufficient evidence to question the fair-
ness of the valuation, the burden of proving that the price is “fair” should shift onto the IP who
approved the transaction.
3.2 | The evidentiary threshold for “unfair harm”
Some of the most common failures of IPs relate to the ability to obtain valuations for intangible
assets (such as goodwill) in pre-packaged sales to connected parties and/or to explain the basis
for the value given to those assets.134 Furthermore, when these mistakes happen, as was the
case in Brewer and Goel, they are significant. These mistakes have the potential to affect a large
number of stakeholders and they usually occur in pre-packaged sales to connected or otherwise
interested parties. In theory, interested parties can challenge these mistakes if they can prove
that they suffered “unfair harm” from the actions of an administrator.135
This statutory duty on administrators to act in the interests of the creditors as a whole came
into force in September 2003, as part of the new administration regime introduced by the EA
2002. A similar power is also recognized in liquidation procedures, where any person
aggrieved136 by an act of the liquidator can apply to the court. As a result of that application,
the court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of.137
Creditors can challenge the use of administrators' powers138 if they prove that a decision
caused or would have caused disadvantage to the claimant;139 and/or they have been subject to
differential treatment from equally ranking claimants, including the decision to sell an asset at
an undervalue.140 Alternatively, they can prove that the decision cannot be justified by refer-
ence to the interests of creditors as a whole or in achieving the objective of the relevant insol-
vency process and/or is discriminatory in effect.141 Once again, the overall picture seems to
suggest a substantive, not simply procedural protection against unfair treatment, in line with
the fairness-oriented framework suggested by this article.
Furthermore, recent cases suggest that the concept of “unfair harm” is not limited to differ-
ential treatment142 and that such a petition can be brought against an administrator even if the
company is no longer in administration.143 Applying a principle from Citicorp,144 the courts also
VACCARI 15
held that, whenever a creditor petitions for the assignment of a potential claim that a company
in administration might have against a third party – which is a rather common request in
administrations –, the administrators should in principle agree to that request unless they can
demonstrate that the claim had no prospect of success.145 The same principles apply in liquida-
tion cases.146 If the potential claim is assigned, this assignment can be challenged if there was
no evidence that the liquidator had investigated matters to evaluate the strengths of any
assigned claims of the company; there was no evidence of negotiations being carried out by the
liquidator and the assignee in regard to the assignments; and there was no evidence that the liq-
uidator had looked elsewhere for offers beyond that made by the assignee.147 In other words, in
Supperstone,148 the High Court reversed the burden of proof between claimants and administra-
tors. It is no longer for the claimant to prove that an action has merit, but it is for the adminis-
trators to prove that a cause of action is without merit if they do not want to assign it.
These circumstances seemingly facilitate the burden of proof for applications from creditors.
In any case, it should be noted that a petition based on “unfair harm” is distinct from a case
centred on breach of fiduciary or other duty, which should be brought under paragraph 75 of
Schedule B1 of the IA 1986 and which could lead to compensation for personal losses.149 This
apparently pro-claimant, fairness-oriented approach is mitigated by the fact that unequal or dif-
ferential treatment is not necessarily unfair if the administrator demonstrates that the inequal-
ity is in the best interests of the creditors.150 If there is a cogent rational explanation for the
differential treatment of a particular creditor, any harm caused will not be unfair.151 The
administrator, however, has to rely on sound commercial reasons relating to the interests of the
creditors as a whole to justify choosing to implement unequal or differential treatment.152
The real issue, however, is another. Establishing a breach of common law and equitable
duty of care requires a high standard of proof, that is, the existence of negligent behaviour.153
Courts restrict their intervention to cases in which the decisions of the office holders do not
withstand logical analysis, which probably means the same as perversity,154 to the extent that
some commentators argue that office holders can never do wrong.155
While the above-mentioned judicial approach on determining breaches of the duty of care
may make for happy reading for office holders,156 not all courts agree on the need to demon-
strate perversity in applications under paragraph 74 of Schedule B1 of the IA 1986. For instance,
in Hockin, the court held that:
“to adopt a test of perversity in place of the statutory test of unfair harm would
plainly be impermissible, and to adopt it in addition to the statutory test would lack
any legislative warrant.”157
As a result, the court concluded that an administrator breached the duty not to unfairly
harm the debtor's creditors if he declined to assign claims that, if successful, would have
resulted in a benefit for the creditors and, if unsuccessful, would have caused no prejudice to
the same creditors.158 However, even after the Hockin test, courts do not interfere with the IPs'
decisions unless they are based on a wrong appreciation of the law or are conspicuously unfair
to a particular creditor or contractor.159 The government itself did not want courts to interfere
with the administrators' business judgment without evidence of irrationality.160
It is argued that in the absence of any suggestion that the administrator was acting improp-
erly, it is contrary to the nature and purpose of an administration for the courts to interfere with
the detailed day-to-day management of the administration.161 However, it is also submitted that
courts probably give greater latitude to administrators than desirable by stating that they would
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interfere with their judgements only in case of total unreasonableness or perversity. In doing
so, they are not investigating if there has been a substantive breach of the principle of fairness.
In liquidation cases, there is an equally strict attitude to challenging the IPs' decisions.
Courts have consistently held that an exercise by a liquidator of powers conferred on him or
her by statute could be called into question only when utterly unreasonable162 and in excep-
tional circumstances.163 Exceptional circumstances arise whenever decisions go beyond what
any reasonable person properly instructed could have considered proper. This high standard of
proof makes life extremely hard for aggrieved and probably unfairly treated claimants.
Although in Edennote, the claimants were successful in challenging the decision of the liquida-
tor, it seems that the threshold of establishing the existence of “unfair harm” or otherwise chal-
lenge any other unreasonable act is too high as gathering evidence of perverse behaviour is
extremely difficult.164
A solution to this dilemma would be to judge the acts of the IP by reference to what is com-
monly referred to as the Wednesbury test.165 According to this test, an exercise of a statutory
power or discretion may be called into question, not only if it can be shown that the exercise of
the power is utterly unreasonable, but also if it was shown that the person exercising the power,
though acting in good faith, took into account considerations which he or she ought not to have
taken into account or failed to take into account considerations which he or she ought to have
taken into account.166 This approach would be entirely consistent with the fairness-oriented
approach advocated by this article because it would give the interested parties a real, fair chance
to challenge the IP's decision.
This course of action was suggested in the first instance decision of the Edennote case with
reference to the judicial assessment of the powers of the liquidators. However, the Court of
Appeal rejected this interpretation. On appeal, it was held that the fact that the lower court also
referred to theWednesbury test of reasonableness, which applies to administrative acts by public
servants, may have been confusing but did not mean that the wrong test had been applied.167
The Court of Appeal did not want to depart from the well-established tradition of the judicial
assessment of the powers of liquidators. Considerations of predictability once again trumped
any opposing argument for fairness-oriented approaches.
It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning of the Court of Appeal is not persuasive. In
Edennote, it is clear that the lower court tried to apply the Wednesbury test to extend the cir-
cumstances in which liquidators can be found in breach of their statutory duties. The
Wednesbury test would not significantly alter the officeholders' liability towards the creditors as
a whole. Creditors would still be unable, for instance, to demand the revocation of an agreed
sale if they are incapable of proving that the company could be rescued as a going concern
and/or constituted a viable business.168 It is, therefore, appropriate to introduce the Wednesbury
test into the law, as the threshold for challenging IPs' decisions is too high (see Goel) and courts
are unwilling to lower the burden of proof for the claimants (see Edennote in the Court of
Appeal).
3.3 | Recent developments
The purpose of this section is to investigate if recent cases mark a significant step forward in
granting enhanced protection to interested parties in case of unfair valuations of the debtor's
assets and/or business. In case of an affirmative answer, the argument for regulatory-heavy
solutions would emerge weaker.
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Over the past few years, there has been a flurry of cases concerning criticisms by interested
parties (creditors and shareholders) of the actions and omissions by IPs. The cases analysed
below have been chosen because they deal with three of the most contentious issues described
in the article:
i the IP's duties and the notion of “unfair harm”;
ii the notion of “fair value”; and
iii the assessment of independent valuations.
While it is submitted that these cases are illustrative of recent trends in case law, one qualifi-
cation is that claims in this area are always highly fact sensitive.
In the recent case of Goel,169 the High Court refused to restrain the joint administrators
from auctioning a proposed claim. This case reinforced the courts' reluctance to interfere with
reasonable commercial decisions of officeholders, in the absence of unfair harm. The court also
reinstated that, while claimants do not need to show negligent or perverse behaviour on the
part of the office holder, the threshold for interference is a high one. Consequently, administra-
tors are generally given a wide measure of latitude when exercising their duties and powers. In
fact, according to the judgment, courts should only intervene in circumstances where the
administrators are proposing a course of action, which is based on either the wrong apprecia-
tion of the law and/or is conspicuously unfair to a particular creditor or creditors of the
company.
This approach to claims under paragraph 74 of Schedule B1 of the IA 1986 has later been
confirmed in Lomas.170 Lehman Brothers Australia (“LBA”) claimed in the English administra-
tion of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LBIE”) for the net balance of sums due from
LBIE to LBA as an unsecured net creditor of LBIE. The request was approved subject to a
“Claims Determination Deed” (“CDD”), which precluded LBA's agreed claim from being
revised upwards. After the discovery of a material mistake in the arithmetic calculation of the
claim, LBA applied for a variation in the approved claim as a consequence of the application of
the rule in ex parte James171 or, alternatively, pursuant to the court's powers to prevent “unfair
harm” by administrators. In rejecting the second claim, the court adopted a conservative
approach. It held that paragraph 74 of Schedule B1 of the IA 1986 concerns the misuse or abuse
of the powers vested in an administrator for the purposes of conducting the administration. The
statutory provision provides for the intervention of the court by controlling or preventing the
exercise of the powers so vested. It is not intended as a procedure or mechanism to impose over-
riding moral constraints on the exercise of legally enforceable contractual rights or to prevent
the unjust enrichment of the estate.172
In Brewer et al. (as joint liquidators of ARI Digital UK ltd) v Iqbal,173 an administrator
(Mr Iqbal) was charged with allegations that he acted negligently or in breach of his equitable
duty of care174 in a pre-packaged sale to a connected purchaser. In particular, the case con-
cerned the sale of intangible assets, that is, three valuable Sky satellite television channels and
their EPGs, and the goodwill of the debtor.175 The case falls squarely within the established
judicial approach to valuations, and to the determination of the existence of fair value and due
consideration for the debtor's assets. Despite finding for the claimants, Briggs J followed a long
line of precedents176 in holding that reliance on apparently competent advice, such as a valua-
tion provided by an independent and qualified expert, does not result in personal liability for
the administrator should the advice turn out to be wrong. The only exception is if such decision
is taken outside the scope of the administrator's powers or contrary to the law.177
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If, however, the administrator departs from proper market testing and does not rely on com-
petent and timely independent advice (as in Brewer), the court is not bound to conclude that
the sale price represents a truthful assessment of the value of the assets and/or the business.
Still, this occurs only when the administrator's decision does not withstand logical analysis and
not – as suggested in this article – when the administrator fails to take reasonable steps to get
the fair price for the assets.
Less controversially, the decision in Brewer also follows the established judicial approach on
the assessment of conflicting expert evidence. This was also the key issue in the two decisions
in AMT Coffee,178 where Matthews J had to determine if excessive remuneration was paid to
directors and the price of the petitioners' shares. Once again, in AMT Coffee the learned judge
followed the established approach that, in case of similarly objective and independent valua-
tions, courts should not average among them, but should distinguish them on the basis of their
persuasiveness. Matthews J clearly explained the reasons why he took no account of that expert
evidence. Nevertheless, the metaphor of the heap of grain used to justify the conclusion that
directors' remuneration was excessive shows that courts still have to find proper, replicable and
sound approaches to value assets in the absence of independent valuations.
These decisions, therefore, show that recent case law does not embrace the revised, socially
just notion of fairness advocated in this article. Priority is given to ensuring consistency and pre-
dictability, while the protection against abuse is limited to fraudulent or exceptional cases.
3.4 | Abstract
“Fair value” is likely to remain a very contentious and highly litigated notion in the future in
the absence of clear statutory guidance. As stated elsewhere:
“anyone attempting to determine the ‘fair’ price also has to contend with the risk
that any of her embedded assumptions could be wrong, as well as the fact that she
could be wrong about the possible size of those errors.”179
It is argued, however, that some statutory guidance should enhance the fairness of the insol-
vency framework, and result in more balanced and equitable decisions in valuation issues. A
critical assessment of English case law suggests that more should be done to ensure that assets
and businesses are properly assessed and that unsecured creditors are not unfairly harmed.
4 | CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to investigate the degree of fairness (and consistency) in the val-
uation practices adopted by English courts by providing an original interpretation of values
underpinning the modern English insolvency framework. The overarching research questions
were to determine if English case law:
i achieves a fair valuation of the debtor's assets and business; and
ii protects interested parties (mainly creditors and shareholders) who have realistic prospects
of receiving a distribution in foreseeable circumstances against unfair harm.
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This article argued that a fairness-oriented approach should be made transparent and
become an express part of English insolvency law and policy. Under the framework developed
here, valuations of assets and businesses in formal insolvency procedures should be based on
an enhanced, procedural and substantive notion of fairness.
The documentary analysis of this article shows that courts only implement a consistent but
procedurally fair approach to valuations. Case law falls short of implementing substantially fair
practices. This situation prompts calls for transparency and implementation into law of the sub-
stantially and not just the procedurally fair framework. If the specific fairness-oriented frame-
work proposed in this article was applied in insolvency cases, a flexible yet prescriptive notion
of “fair value” should be introduced into the IA 1986. This notion should apply absent any dif-
ferent choice by the parties and should be developed based on internationally accepted stan-
dards such as the IFRS 13 and the regulation on valuation before resolution.
Pursuant to the same framework, courts should challenge the valuations produced by IPs
and independent experts not only when they do not withstand logical analysis but also when
the interested claimants submit sufficient evidence to question the fairness of the value paid for
the debtor's assets and business. If the notion of “fair value” is linked not only to the concept of
“market value” but also to “disposal value,” courts and IPs should be able to dismiss petitions
that fail to consider the peculiar conditions of the market at the time of the sale.
With reference to “unfair harm” - a notion expressly mentioned only in administration cases
but, in reality, relevant to liquidation procedures as well - this article showed that the problem
does not lie primarily in the clarity and scope of the notion. English courts have adopted a flexi-
ble definition, capable of encompassing any differential treatment from equally ranking claim-
ants, including the decision to sell an asset at an undervalue, provided that claimants can
demonstrate that the decision cannot be justified by reference to the interests of creditors. It is
submitted that this represents a reasonably adequate balance between the competing rights of
the creditors to have their interests protected and the IPs' rights not to see any of their decisions
pretentiously challenged in front of a court.
In the case of “unfair harm,” substantially fair outcomes are not achieved mainly due to the
high burden of proof required by the courts to reverse or modify the act or decision challenged
by the interested party. The High Court in Edennote suggested that this threshold should be
lowered by judging the IPs' decisions on the basis of the Wednesbury test. If that approach was
followed, an exercise of statutory power or discretion may be called into question if it was
shown that the person exercising the power, by acting in good faith, has taken into account con-
siderations which he or she ought not to have taken into account or failed to take into account
considerations which he ought to have taken into account. As a result, it is argued here that
there is the need for codification of the Wednesbury test into the relevant sections of the IA
1986 dealing with the duties of administrators and liquidators.
This study (reported in two separate articles) has highlighted the importance of social justice
in insolvency and bankruptcy cases, evidenced the inadequacy of existing theories to implement
social justice tenets in this context, and proposed a specific, fairness-oriented framework to
understand whether assets and businesses are fairly valued in insolvency and bankruptcy cases.
It has subsequently discussed the extent to which existing valuation techniques and their practi-
cal implementation by the English courts promote a fairness-oriented approach to valuation of
assets and businesses in insolvency. Finally, it has discussed the impact that a fairness-oriented
framework which addresses substantive as well as procedural issues would have on judicial
powers. The conclusions of this article can be applied to valuation of assets for both corporate
insolvency and personal bankruptcy cases.
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This second article has made a case for regulatory reforms to address the shortcomings dem-
onstrated in this article rather than prescribing more detailed and prescriptive procedures to
assess corporate assets in insolvency. The issue is not primarily the availability of valuation
methodologies, but their proper and informed use by the judiciary.
Further research may be needed to examine the extent to which the fairness-oriented frame-
work discussed in this article is suitable for transplantation more generally into English corpo-
rate insolvency and personal bankruptcy law. In fact, issues of balance between conflicting
interests may feature more prominently in areas such as distribution of assets and creditors' vot-
ing rights. Further research may also be needed to investigate if there are significant and impor-
tant value differences as to what is fair, as suggested by some authors,180 and the extent to
which the consent of those affected by a decision is relevant to its fairness.181
The judicial approach to valuations of the assets and businesses of failing companies is not
flawed in its entirety. It is in need of retuning, in order to better deal with fair measurement
issues, especially in connected sales or where expert valuations are not fully persuasive, and to
protect those interested parties who are affected by unfair transactions and who suffered unfair
harm from the IPs. If regulatory changes are limited to the areas suggested in this article, it is
expected that the distributive policies advocated in it would not decay into base rent seeking or
in windfalls for those who have political sway.
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